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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PRoCEss-ScoPE OF !NQumy IN liABBAs 
CoRPus PETITIONS FROM Mn.rrARY ProsoNER.s--Petitioners, military personnel, 
were convicted by courts martial of rape and murder. After exhausting military 
appellate remedies, they petitioned federal civil courts for writs of habeas 
corpus on the ground that they had been convicted in proceedings denying 
them basic constitutional r.ights. The petitions were denied. On appeal, 1zeld, 
affirmed, two justices dissenting. When the record shows that military courts 
have fairly considered all of the allegations of the petitioners and have found 
no denial of constitutional rights, civil courts in habeas corpus proceedings 
will not hear evidence on the merits of the allegations. Burns 11. Wilson, 346 
U.S. 137, 73 S.Ct. 1045 (1953). 
Civil courts have the power to issue writs of habeas corpus for military 
prisoners.1 Traditionally, the inquiry has been limited to determining whether 
military courts had jurisdiction as to the person, the offense, and the power to 
impose the sentence.2 Civil courts do not have jurisdiction to review the 
proceedings for error, 8 as error can be reached only in direct review by military 
appellate courts. Habeas corpus is a collateral and not a direct attack on the 
legality of the sentence as a basis for detention, and to secure release by this 
writ the sentence must be wholly void for lack of jurisdiction, and not merely 
voidable for error.4 However, in recent civil cases the courts have extended 
the scope of inquiry in habeas corpus proceec;lings beyond the technicalities 
of jurisdiction to determine whether the petitioner was convicted after being 
denied constitutional rights.6 The underlying theory is that by depriving the 
accused of his constitutional rights, the cot!rt is divested of the jurisdiction 
1 Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2 (1866); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879); 
McClaugbty v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49, 22 S.Ct. 786 (1902). 
2 "The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction." In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 at 150, II 
S.Ct. 54 (1890); Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 70 S.Ct. 495 (1950); 25 &t. Jon., 
Habeas Corpus §99 (1940); Wurfel, ''Military Habeas Corpus," 49 l\lhCH. L. REv. 493, 
699 at 714, n. 210 (1951). This was the basis of Justice Minton's concurring opinion. 
a In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126, 21 S.Ct. 48 (1900); E."' parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 
243 (1864); Hiatt v. Brown, note 2 supra. 
4 McClaughi:y v. Deming, note 1 supra; E."' parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); 25 
&t. JUR., Habeas Corpus §§27, 28 (1940). 
G Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938); Waley v. Johnson, 316 
U.S. 101, 62 S.Ct. 964 (1942); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 63 S.Ct. 177 (1942); 39 
C.J.S., Habeas Corpus §15 (1944). 
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which it originally had.6 Courts martial derive jurisdiction from statutes, and 
if the statutes are not precisely followed, the court martial is without jurisdiction 
to act. 7 It would seem that the Constitution no less than the statutes controls 
courts martial, so that deviation from its standards also would divest the 
military court of jurisdiction. Of the personal rights contained in the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments, military personnel are specifically denied only one, 
the right to indictment by grand jmy, and by implication the remaining rights 
should apply to them.8 These rights may be modified somewhat by the 
requirements of discipline, but they cannot be completely ignored merely 
because a person is in uniform. Federal courts have jurisdiction to issue habeas 
corpus when a military prisoner's constitutional rights have been violated.9 The 
rule has been stated as follows: ". . . It is open for a civil court in a habeas 
corpus proceeding to consider whether the circumstances of a court-martial 
proceeding and the manner in which it was conducted ran afoul of the basic 
standard of fairness which is involved in the constitutional concept of due 
process of law, and if it so finds, to declare that the relater has been deprived 
of his liberty in violation of the fifth amendment and to discharge him from 
custody."10 The Court in the present case was willing to inquire beyond 
the traditional limit of jurisdiction to determine whether the defendants were 
subjected to "fundamental unfairness.''11 The difference of opinion arose over 
how to determine whether this had happened. The majority finds that when 
it is established in habeas corpus proceedings that a reviewing military court12 
has fairly heard the charges of unfairness, its decision is binding on civil 
courts, while the dissenting justices argue that habeas corpus can issue if the 
facts show the military court erred in applying the standards of due process 
formulated by civil courts. The traditional limitation of jurisdiction leaves 
military courts practically free to act as they will and is no real protection of 
constitutional rights of military personnel. A balance must be struck. between 
protecting these rights and allowing military courts discretion to accommodate 
the requirements of discipline. The decision in the principal case affords more 
protection to individual rights than the traditional limited inquiry without 
unduly intruding into the area of military law, for military courts, more familiar 
with the problems involved, are given some finality of decision. The "funda-
6 Waley v. Johnson, note 5 supra; Brock v. Hudspeth, (10th Cir. 1940) 111 F. (2d) 
447; Schwartz, ''Habeas Corpus and Court-Martial Deviations from the Articles of War," 
14 Mo. L. REv. 147 (1949); cases cited in principal case at 154. 
7 Flaclanan v. Hunter, (D.C. Kan. 1948) 75 F. Supp. 871; McCiaughry v. Deming, 
note 1 supra. 
s Shapiro v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1947) 69 F. Supp. 205. 
028 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §2241. 
10 United States ex rel. Innes v. ffiatt, (3d Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 664 at 666; fficks 
v. Hiatt, (D.C. Pa. 1946) 64 F. Supp. 238. 
11 Principal case at 142. 
12 The Uniform Code of Military Justice requires approval of a court martial's sentence 
by the convening Officer, 50 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §652, and the Board of Review in 
the Judge Advocate General Department, id., §653. An appeal may then 'be taken to the 
Court of Military Appeals to correct alleged error 'below. Id., §654. 
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mental fairness" implicit in the Fifth Amendment13 requires a fair hearing 
before a competent tribunal. A court martial has jurisdiction to hear these 
cases,14 and when the charges of deprivation of constitutional rights are fairly 
heard by competent military appellate courts, this review is the constitutional 
fundamental faimess to which the defendant is entitled. After it is established 
that this military review is fair, there would seem to be no reason to allow the 
defendant to repeat his argument in a civil court, for the civil courts reserve 
power to issue habeas corpus if the allegations are not fairly considered, and 
this should be adequate insurance against the military court's abusing its 
power.15 
Eugene Alkema 
13 United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, note IO supra. 
14 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 50 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §577. 
15 See generally 15 A.L.R. (2d) 389 (1951); Wurfel, ''Military Habeas Corpus," 49 
MICH. L. REv. 493, 699 (1951); Antieau, "Courts-Martial and the Constitution," 33 
MA.RQ. L. REv. 25 (1949). 
